Power and regional security: A comparative discourse on ECOWAS and SADC

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Abstract

The paper discussed the power indices in the ECOWAS and the SADC, which accounted for their timeous response to security threats and violent outbursts in their respective regions. ECOWAS is seen as a historical model of sub-regional integration and human security organisation, given its engagement in several conflicts arising from its weak states, while SADC has focused on containing threats emerging from the relics of settler colonialism with periodic convulsion in its domain. The study identifies the indices of power within these two regions and their nexus to achieve regional security goals. It adopted a case study research design and relied on data from secondary sources, which were presented qualitatively and analysed with content analysis technique. It made a discourse on the uniformity and differences between power indices in ECOWAS and SADC and concluded that strengthening of existing institutions is imperative. Besides, revolutions in the industrial and technological capacities of the sub-regions are necessary for the achievement of set regional security goals.

Keywords – Africa, ECOWAS, Power, Regional security, SADC

1. INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War global strategic security configuration has marked the dominance of the regional security paradigm in academic and policy discourses. This is attributed to the increase in the interdependence between states due to the end of divisive ideologies of the preceding era. It is also rooted in the dynamics of contemporary threats which emerged from intra-state conflicts leading to civil wars, insurgencies and terrorism; with domino regional effects. These are recurring decimals in Africa where weak states and other relics of European colonialism continue to threaten states' stability and the wellbeing of the citizenry, as experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Libya, Burundi and Rwanda amongst others. Regional responses to these conflicts on the continent vary due to the corresponding variation in regional capacity to mobilise resources to contain them.

Experience has shown that ECOWAS and SADC are more responsive to conflicts and threats of violent outburst in their domains, compared to other regional organisations on the continent (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017; Odigie, 2017). Such responses are anchored on the 'power' of these regional organisations in comparative terms within the continent. This discourse, therefore, focuses on identifying the indices of 'power' and its nexus with regional security and makes a comparative discourse on ECOWAS and SADC. It is divided into six sections including the introduction. Section two reviewed relevant literature, section three outlines the methodology adopted in the study, section four

presents the power indices of ECOWAS and SADC vis-à-vis, regional security on a table. Section five discusses the findings of the study; and section six concludes the discourse with some recommendations.

2. LITERATURE SURVEY

Regional security has been seen as measures adopted by states locked up in a security complex to contain perceived common threats in the international system (Tavares, 2010). Power on the other hand deals with the mobilisation of both the tangible and intangible resources of individuals or collectives to impose their will upon others in a given relationship (Bendix, 1966:29). Morgenthau (1967:127-168) outlines and discusses the indexes of power in international relations to include: geographical location, endowment with natural resources such as food, raw materials, and energy resources; industrial and military capacity cum preparedness and quality of leadership. Others are population distribution and trends, national character and morale as well as the quality of diplomacy and government. It is the aggregation of these factors that leads to hierarchical power relations between states and regions. It therefore produces the asymmetrical relationship between states and regions since these resources are not evenly distributed across regions. The acquisition and utilisation of power therefore remain the central theme of realist scholars (Morgenthau, 1967; Carr, Cox & Cox, 1946; Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013; Mearsheimer, 2001).

To the realists, international politics is all about interest defined in terms of power; and every form of interstate relations is a struggle for power either to dominate or maintain the status quo (Morgenthau, 1967). Although, the dominance of power politics has been criticised by the liberalists and pacifists amongst others; the possession and utilisation of power by states in a security complex are essential in containing threats as securitised by regional actors (Coşkun, 2006; Keohane & Nye, 1977). More so, the possession and utilisation of power by states account for prestige and hierarchy among states and regions in the international system and membership of some exclusive subsystem such as the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and as well as the Group of Seven (G7) amongst others (Akinboye & Attoh, 2005).

Traditionally, power was measured by states security cum military capabilities which are `regarded as 'hard power'. These involve the sophistication of military and weaponry as well as actors' capacity to deploy them advantageously in offensive or defensive military operations. This perspective dominates academic and policy discourses over centuries and was at its climax during the Cold War era (Baldwin, 1997; Nye, 2013). However, the undeniable evidences of cooperation between states and regions outside the military and security realms led to the identification of 'soft power' as an evolutionary trend in interstate relations. According to Nye (2008), soft power is a psychological means of exercising influence through the shaping of preferences and behaviour of other states without the traditional 'carrot and stick' or military and economic coercion as reflected in public diplomacy of states in the post-Cold War era. It involves the ability to get things done without coercion or payment (Nye Jr, 2004: X). Indices of such attraction include culture, values and foreign policies (Nye Jr, 2004:11).

Culturally, soft power refers to various meaningful practices within the society such as art, education and literature popular among the elites as well as mass entertainment and sport industry such as pop music, cinema, professional football, soap operas and movies subsector. Politically, it dwells on the capacity of national institutions, values and normative practices to impact on the preferences of other states; these practices include: promotion of the rule of law, democracy, accountability and social justice. In the realm of foreign policy, soft power focuses on the ability of states to maintain legitimacy and moral authority in its relationship with other actors in the international system (McClory 2019; Nye Jr, 2004; 2008). Hence, soft power is seen as the second face of power which captures the intangible elements of power such as agenda setting and their capacity to influence the preferences of other states (Lukes, 2005). The essence is to acquire credibility and maintain international support for socio-political actions (Nye Jr, 2004).

However, some scholars have also criticised soft power's inadequacy in terms of conceptual, institutional and political dimensions in addressing the emerging trends in international security discourse (Cammack, 2008). These

scholars have therefore identified what they called 'smart power' as trendy in containing threats in regional security complexes. According to Wilson III (2008:115) smart power entails the combination of the elements of 'hard power' and 'soft power' in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that an actor's foreign policy objectives are effectively and efficiently achieved. The emphasis of smart power therefore is the ability to skillfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies (Armitage & Nye, 2007:). The combination is necessary given the tendency of both genres to interact and reinforce one another in contemporary global practices, as illustrated by the US war in Iraq. All said, discourses on power centre on the capacity to deploy both tangible and intangible assets in order to influence others and obtain the desired outcome (Morgenthau, 1967).

The central role of power in security calculus both at global and regional level is evidence in the emergence of hegemons in the international system. The end of World War II and subsequent global configuration was weaved around the Allied Powers; while the defeated Axis Powers: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperialist Japan were stripped off of such status. The 'super power' prestige was accorded the United States, Russia, France, Britain and China, which lead to their 'Big Five' status in the UN Security Council with 'veto power' over decisions of the council. Thus, these countries became hegemons within their respective regions and accounted for the creation of 'spheres of influence' (SOI) throughout the days of the Cold War (Akinboye & Attoh, 2005). Hence, the United States worked for the creation of Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948 which provided a common security umbrella for American States since its establishment and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to cater for the regional security needs of both sides of the Atlantic. Similarly, Russia led in Eastern Europe and succeeded in the creation of Warsaw Pact in the Cold war era; and has invented the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the demise of Soviet Union to enhance amity-security complex in its 'Near Abroad' and neighbourhood (Hedenskog & Larsson, 2007; Krasner, 1982; Luarelle, 2015).

The utility of power in regional security is also seen in North East Asia where China has risen to balance the US influence in the region and has become a major facilitator of inter-Korean dialogue. Indeed, the recalcitrance of North Korea in the region is attributable to its acquisition of nuclear technology and weaponry which has increased its influence in the security matrix of the region and the world at large (Choi & Kim, 2017; Elleman, 2017). In the same vein, Germany, Britain and France dominance of the European Union is directly linked to their power status in Western Europe (Sperling, 2001). Power is also illustrated by the posture of Israel in the Middle East in spite of its micro population and land mass when compared with its Arab neighbours as well as the nuclear arm race of Iran to increase its relevance in the region (Rabinovich, 2015). Again, the deterrence in the Indian / Pakistani and Chinese conflict over Kashmir in the enmity- security complex is due to the attainment of nuclear parity by all parties, amongst others factors in the region (Sum, Moorthy & Benny, 2013). In Africa, the prominent role of Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa in security realm arises from their relative power advantages in these regions (Essuman-Johnson, 2009).

Hence, power is an essential currency for survival in an enmity-security complex as well as in the building and functioning of a region security mechanism in amity security complex. It is also important in the configuration and operations of regional security mechanisms given the validity of 'hegemonic stability' in security regime (Keohane, 2005). Power in terms of capabilities determines the emergence of a hegemon at all levels and their activities. The relevance of a hegemon is reflected in their role as 'lead nations' in the formation and operations of regional security mechanisms (Acharya. 1999; Haggard, Mansfield & Milner, 1997; Solingen, 2005; 2008). These explain the centrality of Nigeria and South Africa in the formation of ECOWAS Standby Force and SADC Standby Force in West and Southern Africa respectively. Similarly, Brazil, leaning on 'consensual hegemony', led in the formation of Union of South America Nations (UNASUR) as 'hemispheric cooperative security' mechanism in Latin America to contain the overbearing influence of the US in the region, which is collectively securitised as a threat. This provides a platform for South American security outside the US dominated OAS (Burges, 2008; Nolte & Wehner, 2012; Varas, 1998). More so, the leading roles of the Western Super Powers in the formation and sustenance of the OAS, NRF and JEF

respectively are anchored on their hegemonic status and 'lead nations' roles in their respective regions (Essuman-Johnson, 2009; Hendriks, 2014; Molling, 2007).

These 'lead nations' have become veritable anchors for regional security. For instance, the intervention of NATO in the Balkan conflict in the 1990s was facilitated by the deployment of smart power by the United States. The US set the agenda by her securitisation of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as a threat to the entire region, with the capacity to engage other global actors given the transnational and religious dimensions of the conflict; and therefore lobbied other NATO members in Western Europe to support the PSO (Roberts, 1999). Similarly, Nigeria led in the securitisation of unconstitutional change of government and preference for democratic governance in ECOWAS which was captured in the reviewed ECOWAS Treaty in 1993. This justified Nigeria's leadership in the restoration of President Tejan Kabbah to power after the Johnny Koromah coup in Sierra Leone; even under the military dictatorship of General Sani Abacha in 1997 (Ali, 2012; Ismail, 2015). Moreso, South Africa also led in the securitisation of anti-human security occurrences in SADC through the two SADC's Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). This was illustrated by South Africa's leadership in the SADC securitisation of the Lesotho conflict and subsequent intervention in 1998 (Muntscik, 2011, Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

Another dimension of power in regional security is the capacity to invent strong socio-historical narratives by actors in the desire to influence the opinion of others within the region and the entire global audience. Such narratives are meant to legitimise the activities of these actors in the securitisation and desecuritisation of issues and threats. In the Middle East, Israel has consistently laid claim to Jerusalem and its environs as the promised land of their fathers in line with Biblical history of the Jews. These narratives find favourable audience among the Judeo-Christian populations across the world and legitimise the continuous occupation and extension of Jewish Settlement in West Bank and Gaza Strips as well as her desire to forcefully adopt Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state. On the other hand, the Arabs narratives explain the occupation of the Palestine land by Israel as an imperialist agenda of the western countries against Islam which must be resisted by Jihadist strategy; since the contemporary occupation of Israel is a post-World War II development (Shahak & Vidal, 1994). Thus, global opinion is highly divided over the Palestine question which has led to a stalemate on the resolution of the regional conflict.

Similarly, in the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), President Bush tried to convince the Muslims that America has nothing against the Muslims in the Middle-East, and elsewhere in the world, but was fighting against Al – Queda and other terrorist elements in the region. The desire to spread this narrative led to the establishment of Al-Hurra television, Radio Farda and Radio Sawa to present this view and appeal to Farsi and other Arabic speaking audience in Iran and other parts of Middle East on the war against Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Khatib & Dodds, 2009). Moreso, in South America, UNASUR dwells on the need for 'hemispheric cooperative security' and the mantra of 'South America for South Americans' to counter the overwhelming influence of the United States in the region in order to justify the need for a separate regional security organisation and mechanism outside the US dominated OAS. These narratives have helped in the consolidation of UNASUR as the preferred arbiter in conflict mediation in the region within the last ten years and locked out the US in the security matrix of the region (Nolte & Wehner, 2012; Varas, 1998).

In Africa, similar narratives which arose from Rwandan genocide facilitated the transformation of the OAU to AU and its PSOs activities. Specifically, the narratives on the need for the continent to expulse 'non-interference' clause in the OAU Charter in favour of 'non-indifference' in the AU Constitutive Act gained global audience and acceptance. Related to this is the narrative on Pan Africanism and the coinage of 'Africans solution to Afrcians' problem' which has helped in the legitimatisation of the AU and its conflict management mechanisms as the first responder to conflict zones on the continent. In the same vein, ECOWAS narratives during The Gambian political conflict in 2016/2017 securitised the recalcitrant Yahya Jammeh as a threat to the sub-region. This narrative legitimised the ESF forceful intervention in The Gambian conflict and subsequent departure of Yahya Jammeh to

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Equatorial Guinea for political exile in January 2017 (Odigie, 2017; Hartman, 2017; Dersso, 2010; Desmidt & Hauck, 2017; Beza, 2015; Batware, 2011).

All told, though the existence of regional security complex is the primary motivation for the formation of regional security organisations and mechanisms; the possession of power in terms of capabilities is essential in the building and operations of these mechanisms. Here, power includes the possession of strong military and economic indexes, technology, natural resources, diplomatic finesse, attractive values and effective leadership. Power constitutes the tangible and intangible assets required for the generation and deployment of a rapid deployment capability of a regional standby force.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The preferred framework for this study is Power Theory. It is seen as the ability of an individual or group to impose its will upon other(s) in any form of relationship (Bendix, 1966:290). Proponents of this theory include Arnold Wolfers (1962), Hans Morgenthau (1967) and Joseph Frankel (1973). Wolfers (1962) refers to power as the ability to move others or make them to do what one desires, not to do what one does not approve, since it involves the ability to move others by the threat or affliction of deprivation. In other words, it is the capacity to get one's wishes carried out despite opposition, and the capacity to influence the actions of others in accordance with one's own ends (Frankel, 1973:64).

To Morgenthau (1967:32-33) power involves psychological relation between and entity who exercise it and others over whom it is exercised. This is simplified by Dahl's (1969: 80) explanation that 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do'. Power is derived from and measured by both tangible and intangible assets of a nation or region. The basic assumptions of Power Theory include:

1. power involves the capacity of a nation or group of nations to deploy its tangible and intangible resources in a way that affects the behaviour of others;
2. power is the sum total of a nation or group of nations' actual capabilities;
3. power is majorly measured by the possession of superior military, technology and economic capabilities, as well as the needed manpower to deploy them for national or group's advantages;
4. power is relational, as it consists of the relative measurement of capabilities between nations or group of nations;
5. power relation is dynamic and therefore changes with time and development; and
6. power has its psychological utility even in latent state.

However, Power Theory and the deployment of 'hard power' has been criticised by pacifists who oppose any form of violence or the use of force in social interaction (Akinboye & Attoh, 2005). The liberalists also accuse 'hard power' scholars of generating a 'single factor' theoretical approach which fails to capture other forms of interaction and the ubiquitous cooperation among states in the international system (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Howbeit, the identification of 'soft power' and 'smart power' by scholars in recent years has increased the acceptance of Power Theory in socio-political discourse (Nye Jr, 2004; Wilson III, 2008). Its relevance to this study lies in its capacity to comparatively evaluate the ECOWAS and SADC capabilities in relation to their respective regional security

Table 1: Power indices and regional security in ECOWAS and SADC

S/N	Power indices in Regional security	ECOWAS	SADC
1.	Geographical location	ECOWAS is the aggregation of states in West African where the Gulf of Guinea begins, most of the countries in the region have access to the Atlantic Ocean	SADC is made up of states in the Southern Africa. Some of its members are part of the Gulf of Guinea and are bounded by Atlantic Ocean, while others are opened to the Indian Ocean. Thus it is located on the major international trade route
2.	Endowment of natural resources and energy	The sub-region has abundance of agricultural and natural resources, such as gold, crude oil, coffee and other cash crops	SADC is a major exporter of iron ore, gold copper, it is also a food basket and a major crude oil exporter.
3.	Industrial capacity	The industrial capacity of ECOWAS is very low. This arises from its peripheral status in world economic system	SADC has a more vibrant industrial sector, which is attributed to 'settlers colonialism' and prolong white minority rule and the perception of its power house as an extension of the West
4.	Military capability preparedness technology/ leadership	ECOWAS military preparedness is on the average. Nigeria military leadership is complemented by Cote'd'ivoire, Senegal and Ghana	Military capability of SADC is above average on the continent, South Africa provides the leadership and technology while Angola and Zimbabwe complement in terms of logistic and trained personnel
5.	Population distribution and trend	West Africa has a moderate population in Africa and the population growth rate is high millennial is said to be more than a third of the population	Southern Africa has moderate population figure but the growth rate is high among the average on the continent
6.	Hegemonic stability	Nigeria serves as a benign hegemon in West Africa and has been the engine room of the regional integration and security projects	South Africa is the regional hegemon in the region and has done much to transform FLS alliance to SADC with socioeconomic integration and regional security agenda
7.	Agenda setting	ECOWAS leading in setting the agenda for regional integration and promoting of human security within its members states and on the continent	SADC leads in setting human security agenda within its fold and rapid military response to humanitarian crises military response to humanitarian crises on the continent
8.	Foreign policy	ECOWAS has been accepted as a first responder to conflict and security threats in the sub-region. It has related with the AU and other sub-regional blocks on the continent as an authentic voice. It has similarly served as a 'gate way' for the EU, US, NATO and the UN engagement on issues of global interest	SADC has asserted itself as a Pan-Southern African body capable of taking responsibilities on security and conflict resolution in it domain. It activities in collaboration with the EU, US, NATO and other regional organizations are testimonies of effective foreign policy decisions and actions.
9.	Binding institutional framework	ECOWAS is replete with binding institutional frameworks. These include; the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty, the Mechanism and its supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the ECPF	SADC is bound by several related institutional frameworks such as the SADC Amended Treaty 2001, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 2001 and the Mutual Defense Pact 2003
10.	Shared values and norms	ECOWAS through its institutional framework has inundated its shared values such as the preference of democracy, economic liberalisation, mutual non-aggression, promotion of human security, abhorrence for unconstitutional change of government and the preference for peaceful resolution of conflict.	SADC has shared values and norms such as the promotion of liberal democracy, racial indiscrimination, intolerance for unconstitutional change of government, mutual non-aggression, and rejection of violence as a means of settling dispute between groups within a state and between states.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A Case study research is adopted in this discourse as it probes deeply, intensively and analysed the interaction between variables involve in the study (Idaka & Anagbogu, 2012). This methodology has the advantage of linking power indices of ECOWAS and the SADC to regional security, and discuss how these interaction leads to the achievement of regional security of the two domains. It also has an added value of providing the pathway for similar studies on power and regional security in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Although the study focused on ECOWAS and SADC as the area of study, the discourse covers issues of common concern to Africa and the larger global community. The study relies solely on secondary data, which were sourced from extant literature such as textbooks, journals, publication of international organisations and other periodicals. These data were presented qualitatively and content analysis was used in the discussion of research findings.

5. DISCUSSION: POWER AND REGIONAL SECURITY: A COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE ON ECOWAS AND SADC

Although the geo-strategic politics is on the decline due to the development of missiles technology which makes it possible to strike at any targeted location in the world, yet the location of states or group of states determine security threats and means of containing them. ECOWAS is located on the West Coast of Africa which gives it access at Atlantic Oceans and the littoral states are opened to the Gulf of Guinea. Hence the enormous seaports open the region to global economy and international trade, these ports are also important in the defence of the region especially during the deployment of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) as were done during the Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambian conflicts. Similarly, the massive landmass of the region which terminates in the Sahel gives ECOWAS members states access to the Maghreb region and the resources. Thus, ECOWAS enjoys the trans-Sahara trade routes to Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia which are linked to Europe. The import of these amongst others is that the location of ECOWAS is favourable to trade and commerce, as well as provide easy movement for logistics and equipment required for emergency Peace Support Operations which is an essential part of the regional security measures institutionalised by the sub regional group (OECD, 2006; Mendonsa, 2002; United Nations Security Council, 2013).

SADC on the other hand covers the Southern end of the Africa continent with access to both the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The temperate weather and the natural deep seaports make the region attractive to white settlers and a home to global shipping and maritime industries respectively. These have brought enormous wealth to the region and encouraged trade and commerce. The huge volume of trade between SADC and the rest of the world especially the European Union (EU) can be attributed to its geographical location amongst other factors. Besides, the need to protect the maritime assets in this region has led to the building of vibrant Navy by member states. South Africa has the oldest naval force in the region with continental capability and reach. Similarly, the table land in the region has been inundated with airports and military airfields which are essential assets for the delivery of humanitarian materials and military logistics needed for PSOs. These assets are central to the implementation of regional intervention during disasters or conflicts. These were aptly demonstrated during the Amani Africa II (AAII) Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Lothala, South Africa (Hwang, 2007; Iliffe, 2017; African Union, 2015; SADC, 2015a).

ECOWAS is blessed with abundant natural and energy resources which accounts for its foreign exchange earnings and include: Agricultural (Kaolinite, Limestone, Phosphates); fuels (Coal and petroleum); metals (Bauxite and Iron Ore); Metallic elements (Chromium, copper, gold, lead, manganese, lead, tin, lithium, uranium and zinc) and minerals (diamond, gypsum, salt, marble, retile, zircon and limonite). Iron ore is found in Cote'd ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Guinea are net exporters of gold, while Senegal has enormous deposit of phosphate, Cape Verde mines salt and Nigeria is a major crude oil and natural gas deposit in the world. These resources are the economic backbone of ECOWAS and they have also accorded prestige to the region. Most importantly is their role in the funding of regional security ventures in the sub-region. For instance, Nigeria's capacity to lead the sub-regional security projects, hangs on the enormous revenue derived from the sale

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of crude oil. This has been instrumental to the funding of ECOWAS PSOs and other conflicts prevention and management measures – the central thrusts of the ECOWAS regional security policies (Jalloh, 2013; Odigie, 2017; Ali, 2012). Nevertheless, the contest for the control and management of these resources has been sources of threats to the regional security by fueling and sustaining conflict as experienced in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and the role of 'blood diamond' in the sustenance of Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts respectively (Asangna, 2017; Engwicht, 2016; Kaur, 2013).

SADC is a home of solid mineral accounting for 50% global platinum and vanadium, as well as energy resources, their impact on the economy of the region is legendary. Natural resources in the region include: Agricultural (Phosphates and limestone); fuels (coal and petroleum); metallic elements (Gold, Cobalt, Cadmium chromium, lead and nickel, manganese, silver, platinum, tungsten, uranium, zinc, tin); metals (Iron ore, Bauxite and Tantalite); minerals (Diamond, salt and asbestos) and non-metallic elements (Sulphur, fluorite, potash and soda ash). These resources are major foreign exchange earners for the region; South Africa is a major producer of gold, iron ore, copper and platinum. Angola is a net crude oil exporter and the Democratic Republic of Congo is a major choice destination for mining and extractive industry in Africa. Trading in these resources has increased the importance of the region in international trade and strategic recognition globally. These provide funding for the sustenance of the regional security projects in its domain. However, these resources have been a source of conflicts and threats to the regional security as experienced in the Marikana Mine in South Africa, the DR Congo and the Angolan civil war where revenue from gold, oil and blood diamond were instrumental to the conflicts and their sustenance (Maphosa, 2012; Desmidt & Hauck, 2017).

The missing link in ECOWAS power indices is the industrial capacity which is generally low and this is attributed to the grafting of the region into the vortex of global capitalism as a peripheral zone, expected to provide market and raw materials for the core states in the world economy system (Wallerstein, 1968). Sapre, Ndiaye and Manga (2017) observed that the industrial sector contribution to the GDP of ECOWAS region was 0.9% in 2012; 0.8% in 2013 and 1.5% in 2014, which is abysmally low and fluctuating, such fluctuation could be traced to inadequate investment in the required infrastructural facilities that could boost the industrial base of the region and the relics of colonialism (Rodney, 1972). By all indicators, the SADC has greater industrial capacity than the ECOWAS and indeed other regions on the continent. This is due to the legacy of 'settlers' colonialism' in the region, whereby white supremacists invested massively in the industrial sector with the hope of eternal ownership. The peaceful resolution of apartheid menace and the continue control of the industrial sector by the whites in the private sector ensures the continuity and expansion of the sector and its capacity. According to SADC (2018:1) the industrial sector contribution to the GDP of the SADC was 11.2% in 2017 and 11.9% in 2018 respectively. Moreso, the SADC has launched industrial sector development plan towards 2063 (SADC, 2015b). These realities place the SADC ahead of ECOWAS and may as well make it the industrial hub of Africa. The import of this amongst others is that the industrial sector contributes enormous wealth and technology required for the implementation of regional security projects in the Southern Africa.

The ECOWAS military leadership preparedness is on the average as illustrated by its intervention in emergency military conflicts in the sub region. After the initial haphazard intervention in the Liberian crises in 1989, the sub regional body has been able to mobilise its military for PSOs in Sierra Leone (1997); Cote d'ivoire (2001, 2010); Niger (2009, 2015) and Guinea (2003, 2009 and 2012) (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017; Kabia, 2011; Kamara, 2013). ECOWAS successful establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) as part of the African Standby Force and its deployment to contain the Gambian conflict of 2017 was an exemplary, since the deployment of its military asset achieved regional security goal at minimal cost, in terms of casualties and other social indicators. However, the failure to timeously respond to the Malian conflict in 2012 and its inability to contain the terrorists menace in Northern Mali and North Eastern Nigeria, are pointers to its weakness in military technology and other resources required for the evolving regional security threats (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017).

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The SADC has enormous military capability arising from the military assets of Angola, Republic of South Africa and Zimbabwe amongst others, and the challenges of military preparedness are gradually resolved in the region. Learning from the heavily criticised intervention in the Lesotho and DR Congo crises in 1998, the SADC improved its rating in deployment of Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to the Eastern DR Congo in 2013, in furtherance of the UN Security Council Resolution 2098 of 2013. The defeat of M23 rebels and the reduction of armed groups in the region give credence to the rising military leadership of the SADC (Sheeran & Case, 2014; Kadima, 1999, Baker & Maeresera, 2017). Howbeit, the continuous occupation of some territories by armed groups in the Eastern DRC and the constraints on the operations, raise critical questions on the military capability/technology as well as leadership of the SADC, given that a minute threat in the DRC has the capacity to generate a domino effect, capable of threatening the entire region (Sheeran & Case, 2014).

ECOWAS has about 39% of the sub-Saharan African population and the figure currently stands at about 400million, it has a growth rate of about 2.6% and may hit 500 million in 2035 and the 'youth bulge' defined as the people between 15 to 29 years is very heavy (Atta-Asamoah & Kwesi Aning, 2011; Mbanye & Gueye, 2018). The import of this population distribution amongst others is that the region has a young population available for the productive sector of the economy and military service. Many of these young persons are easily mobilised through social media on the internet (Chukwuere, 2020; Ajayi & Adinlewa, 2020). Indeed, ECOWAS is not bereft of the workforce required for optimum economic development, but unemployment is very high due to the structure of the economy where the industrial sector is lamentably minimal and majority of the jobs in the informal sectors are poorly paid, without social security and pension (Mbaye & Gueye, 2018: 1-7). These socio-economic realities therefore have consequences on the regional security. Youth bulge is a power asset in regional security when it serves as a reservoir for labour and military service; but it is a liability or a risk, when unemployment makes recruitment for insurgency and religious radicalization an option for this group, experiences from the North Eastern Nigeria and Northern Mali are instructive (Onuoha, 2014; Dione & Togola, 2018). Besides, the hijack of the peaceful #EndSARS protest by hoodlums and the violent outcome in Nigeria is very instructive.

The SADC is a home to about 345.2 million people as at 2018, which was a 2.5% annual growth rate from the 336.9 in 2017. The 'youth bulge' of the population is also heavy and youth unemployment vary across member states. While DRC, Madagascar, Malawi and Tanzania have less than 10% youth unemployment rate, South Africa, Eswatini, Mozambique and Namibia are saddled with 57.4%, 54.8%, 42.7% and 45.5% respectively (SADC, 2018: 2-3). The implication of this population distribution and trends include: the availability of massive workforce and a pool for military service. The workforce is a regional power asset, while the unemployed youths are liability to the regional security since institutional capacity to support them is inadequate. This leads to hatred and resentment against those perceived to enjoy the available opportunities (Atta-Asamoah & Kwesi Aning, 2011). This may as well explain the frequent xenophobic attacks by South African youths on other African nationals in their country which threatened the regional security balance of the SADC and the entire continent (Dauda, Sakariyau & Ameen, 2018). Therefore, 'youth bulge' in the population of the SADC is a regional power asset and a liability as it is in the ECOWAS region (Atta-Asamoah & Kwesi Aning, 2011).

Keohane (2005) emphasised the essential role of hegemon in regime building, which regional security is one. In ECOWAS, Nigeria is no doubt the hegemon which provides the hegemonic stability in the regional security project. With a population of about 200 million people, it has about 50% of the regional population (Mbaye & Gueye, 2018). Nigeria also has the largest and most equipped armed forces in the region and has been playing leadership roles in initiating and implementing regional security measures in West Africa. It is always in the forefront of contributing troops and equipment for PSOs in the sub-region and was indeed the first initiator of military intervention in conflict Liberia in 1989. Several similar missions have been initiated by Nigeria and ECOWAS member states, notably the deployment of ECOWAS mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) in 2017, which led to peaceful transition of power in the country after disputed elections, and current effort at resolving the Malian conflict after the August 18, 2020 military

coup (Odige, 2017, Ali, 2012; Hartman, 2017). Such leadership role is derived from its economy, said to be the largest in West Africa and indeed the continent (World Bank, 2014).

South Africa is the indisputable hegemon in the SADC and the regional security is anchored on its leadership. With the population of over sixty million people, it is the second largest in the region after the DR Congo (SADC, 2018). However, the industrial sector of South African economy and the relative political stability in the post-Apartheid era, as well as the well -equipped and technologically advanced armed forces bestow the leadership of the region on it. This was illustrated by the leadership in the PSOs in Lesotho and DR Congo in 1998; and its instrumentality to the resolution of the Lesotho crisis in 2015, as well as continuous engagement in the resolution of the DRC Congo till date. Besides, the South African leadership in the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2017, which led to the change of guard between late president Robert Mugabe and the current leadership in the country was exemplary (Kadima, 1999; Baker & Maenesea, 2009; Tendi, 2020).

Agenda setting is an aspect of soft power (Nye Jr, 2004; 2011). ECOWAS has been setting agenda for its member states. These include: economic integration which was the foundational agenda of the founding fathers of the sub-regional body; the regional security and conflict management and prevention agenda, embodied in 'the mechanism' and preference for liberal democracy and abhorrence to unconstitutional change of government, which is captured in the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, as well as the ECPF which illustrate the upliftment of human security paradigm in the region (Atuobi, 2010; Ekiyor, 2008). These agendas have fundamental impact on the continent-wide agenda, for instance, African leaders adopted the human security model at the transformation of the defunct Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) and subsequently created the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Standby Force (ASF) to facilitate humanitarian intervention in emergency violent conflicts on the continent (AU, 2003a; 2003b). The change from state-centric to human security has become an African agenda as sub regional organisations across the continent are buying into it and have established their own regional standby forces amongst others. These have increased the Africans capacity to solve Africans problem (Kasumba & Debrah, 2010). These agendas set by ECOWAS have enjoyed enormous goodwill and buying-in from major development partners and the UN, since there is a nexus between human security, peace and development (African Union-Europe Partnership, 2009).

SADC is not also left behind in setting agenda for its member states and the continent. Its evolution from the Frontline States Alliance (FLS) to SADC is underlined by agenda setting in politics, defence and security which created and subjected the organ for politics, defence and security to the decisions of the summit of the head of states and government (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). This is the replication or regionalisation of the AU's PSC designed to implement human security measures in the region. In order to strengthen confidence between member states, the SADC ratified the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 with the objective of assuaging the fear of domination by smaller countries within its fold, as well as to address security sabotage by smaller countries through any act of aggression or collaboration with a third party (Muntschik, 2011). At the continental level, the SADC was at the forefront of leading the implementation of Africans solution to Africans problem through the establishment of African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) in 2013, after the AU and ECOWAS failed to timeously intervene in the Malian conflict (AU, 2013). The successful establishment of the ACIRC as a 'coalition of the willing' as a stop-gap for the operationalisation of the ASF by 2015 was accepted by the continent. It participation in the Amani Africa II FTX in Lothala was a complement to the RDC of the ASF (AU, 2017).

ECOWAS has legitimised itself as an authentic actor in the international system through its decisions and actions, as well as its relationship with other actors. It rose to prominence in the post-Cold War era, with its intervention in the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises in early 1990s and the revision of its treaty to contain sub-regional threats in the 1990s and concretised the nexus between human security, development and economic integration (Atuobi, 2010; Ekiyor, 2008). To achieve its objectives, ECOWAS consciously seeks the supports of the EU, the US, Japan and the UN amongst others. For instance, ECOWAS policy on unconstitutional change of government and defence of

democratic order has been communicated to the rest of the world pragmatically. This explains the isolation of military regimes in recent years as done to the current Junta in Mali. Similarly, the inter-organisational cooperation mustered by ECOWAS during the Gambia 2017 electoral conflict was commended since its intentions and actions were effectively communicated to the AU, UN, EU and other partners in a manner that enhanced collaboration and facilitated the generation of the requisite political will for the deployment of ECOMIG (Hartman, 2017). Again, ECOWAS has effective foreign policy machineries and structures, this has ensured the appointed United Nations Office Representative in West Africa and Sahel worked closely with it. ECOWAS also maintain a close relationship with the EU Commission and the United States Embassy in Abuja among others, for timely exchange of views and implementation of decisions (Odigie, 2017).

SADC has similarly emerged as an authentic actor on Southern African issues, specifically in economic integration, human security and conflict management. This has been pragmatically communicated to the international community through the ratification of its legal instruments by member states and the SADC intervention in the Lesotho and DR Congo in 1998. The subsequent revision of its treaty in 2001 and its astute collaboration with the UN, EU, AU and other actors in the resolution of the Zimbabwean coup saga in 2017, and the deployment of FIB in DR Congo in 2013 were demonstrations of the effectiveness of its foreign policy. The SADC has effective representation in the EU, AU and also maintain a cordial relationship with the UN East and Southern Africa Regional Office in Kenya which facilitated the regional mediation in the Lesotho crisis in 2015 (Baker & Maeresera, 2009; Kadima, 1999; Sheeran & Case, 2014).

ECOWAS is replete with binding institutional frameworks ratified by member states from its inception in 1975. Such legal frameworks include: the ECOWAS Treaty (1975); the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978); the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence 1981); the Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Custom Matters (1982); the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992); Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993); and three conventions on Extradition (1994). Other frameworks are the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999); the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to 'the Mechanism' (2001), ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunitions and other related materials (2006); ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008); and the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2013) (ECOWAS, 2013: 6-7; Salihu, 2013). These regional frameworks have spelt out obligations and benefits for members in the regional security project and have been adhered to in many instances (Odigie, 2017). Besides, these legal frameworks are the backbones for building and concretisation of amity-security complex in the region and the projection of the regional power in the required directions (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

Similarly, the SADC have several binding institutional frameworks which could be traced to the foundational treaty of the FLSA in 1975. Other legal instruments which enhance its regional security include the protocol on the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (1980); the SADC Treaty (1992), the Protocol on the Establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (1996); the revised SADC Treaty (2001); the Revised Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) (2001) and Mutual Defence Pact (2003) (Cawthra, 2010; Derblom, 2010; Muntschik, 2011; SADC, 1996; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). These institutional frameworks have strengthened the regional security of the SADC and enhanced the formulation and implementation of regional security policies in the region. For instance, the SADC mandated the OPDSC to develop a strategic indicative plan for the organ (SIPO) envisaged to provide the guidelines for the implementation of the protocol. This has been done twice and it produced SIPO I and II. While SIPO I focused on the protection of the people from the threat of failed states, intra-state and interstate conflicts; SIPO II focused on political, defence, state security, public security and the police (SADC, 2004; van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Thus, the SIPOs captured the human security needs of the region and have been the guiding paradigm. This has strengthened the confidence of smaller countries and aided the sustenance of amity-security complex.

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Shared values and norms are essential in shaping the world view of a group of individuals or nation states. These are the binding cords in the securitisation of issues and entities as threats to individuals or regions. ECOWAS has shared values and norms which have strengthened its power and security; the values include: economic liberalism, multi-party democracy, periodic free and fair elections, non-aggressive interaction between member states, peaceful resolution of dispute between states and intolerance for organised crimes, as well as the preference human security (Atuobi, 2010; Odigie, 2017).These values and norms are contained in the continuum of the binding instruments highlighted earlier in this paper. As noted, shared values and norms are instrumental to the securitisation of entities and issues in the sub-region. They have also facilitated the mobilisation of the requisite political will for the implementation of regional security measures. For instance, the preference for democracy and sanctity of the ballot box was central to the ECOWAS mobilisation against Yahya Jammeh in 2017, when he lost the 2016 election and attempted to subvert the will of the electorates. It is also in preference and defence of democratic order that numerous military coups are condemned in the region since the dawn of the new millennium (Hartman, 2017; Odigie, 2017).

Similarly, the SADC has identified with western democratic norms and values. This has translated into the preference for non-discrimination against individuals and groups based on gender, race, religion and status. Besides, the adoption of SIPO I and II has uplifted the emphasis on human security to 'regional commons'. This emphasis is illustrated by the SADC's continued commitment to peace in the DR Congo through the deployment of FIB. Moreso, the continued engagement with all parties in Lesotho crises till date is testimonial to the regional resilience to concretised democratic consolidation and contained unconstitutional change of government and intra-state conflicts. Thus shared values and norms have been instrumental to the operations of the SADC regional security measures. They have also provided the lenses for the securitisation of issues and entities and serve as the springboard for the mobilisation of member states for collective responses to threats (Cawthra, 2010; Muntschik, 2011; Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

6. CONCLUSION

The discourse focused on the nexus between power and regional security in containing the securitised threats in ECOWAS and SADC. It highlighted the role of geographical location, natural resources, industrial capacity, military capability and population amongst others in generating threats, as well as building and implementing security measures in the regions. Evidence from the discourse show that ECOWAS and the SADC have similar indices of power which are projected into their regional security measures and these are geographical location which gives both regions access to Atlantic and Indian Oceans; enormous endowment of natural resources; young and vibrant population; hegemon in Nigeria and South Africa respectively; binding institutional frameworks; regional shared values and norms; vibrant soft power in foreign policy and agenda setting.

However, ECOWAS is more populated than the SADC due to Nigeria's demography and the latter has a stronger industrial capacity and military capability as the result of South Africa's historical dynamics of the last century. Nevertheless, both regions are working hard to strengthen their regional security within the available resources. To this end, the following recommendations are made: (a) both regions need to improve their industrial capacity and create jobs for and teeming population; (b) inter-regional transfer of military and other technologies is an imperative; (c) both regions need to check the emerging threats arising from the revolution in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT), especially the cyberspace; (d) the two regions need to cooperate and share resources and experiences on regional security; and (e) the essentials of human security must be upheld at all times by member states in both regions and Africa at large.

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