The paper using primary and secondary sources is a study the evolution of conflict as a threat to the peace and security of Kaduna metropolis and the effects of crises on its social and economic development. The finding of the paper reveal that the diversity of residents and divisions along the Christian/Muslim dichotomy in Kaduna makes the city to be reflective of the wider Nigerian society with its inherent triggers towards conflict when relations among groups are not properly managed. The paper through exploring conflicts within Kaduna in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries found that the conflicts contributed to segregation in the metropolis and greatly affected social and economic development. The paper in appraising the triggers of the various conflicts such as the Sharia crises and the Miss World riots note that these were neither inevitable or premeditated, but often occurred as a result of flashpoint events then escalated due to the absence of reliable conflict mitigating frameworks such as effective security and credible inter-faith dialogue, which would have offered rapid remedial and preventive responses cognizant of the existing fault lines.

Keywords – Christian/Muslim dichotomy, Conflict and crisis, Kaduna, Segregation

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper appraises Kaduna metropolis and the impact of conflicts on the city and its residents. Although most conflicts in Nigeria may be traceable to the challenges of human development affecting the country, these conflicts often take on the complexion of been ethno-religious conflicts. Religion, ethnicity and politics have often being identified as the raison d’être behind the conflicts in Kaduna metropolis which in turn fuels the Christian/Muslim dichotomy. This work seeks to appraise the challenges that Kaduna faces in the quest to build a harmonious society of its diverse residents made up of Nigerians from different ethnic groups and almost equally divided as adherents of Christianity and Islam (Ukpanya & Abdulhamid, 2017). The focus of the paper is to explore the different conflicts that have occurred in Kaduna metropolis in the last quarter of the twentieth century and in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The paper will offer an appraisal of these conflicts, their trajectories and impact over the years and what mitigating measures the state has taken to address the conflicts and crises in Kaduna.
2. KADUNA METROPOLIS: A BRIEF BACKGROUND

Kaduna metropolis which is one of the major urban centres in Nigeria to have reached the one million mark in terms of population is the capital city of Kaduna state. Kaduna was established in the opening decades of the twentieth century first as a railway terminus and then regional capital and from 1967 as the capital of North-Central state, which would later become Kaduna state. The city, which is a sprawling metropolis has witnessed accelerated population growth since its designation as colonial headquarters of Northern Nigeria in 1913 and eventual takeoff in that status in 1917. The population of the metropolis by the 2006 National Census was 760,000. The current population estimates of the city by 2020 was expected to be above 1.2 million. Kaduna state by the 2006 census had a population of 6.1 million. The state’s projected population by 2020 is estimated at 9,247,222 persons. The composition of the metropolitan and state population is characterized by its youthfulness with 44% of the population being less than 15 years of age. Current livelihood realities are however dire as 22 percent of the working age population in the state were unemployed with a greater percentage of the state population living in poverty (Kaduna State Planning and Budget Commission and United Nations Population Fund, 2017).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, factors that had made the emergence of Kaduna as a capital city possible had been its ideal centralized location in Northern Nigeria, especially in the context of the town’s location on a railway network which was crucial for communication and transportation of both military and commercial assets within the region and nationally during the colonial era (Jibril, 2016). Kaduna is blessed with a clement weather and the city possesses a good water supply with the River Kaduna passing through and providing the city with its name. The city has grown tremendously over the past century and is now a sprawling metropolis comprising four local government areas (LGA). Two are at the heart of the city – Kaduna North and Kaduna South LGAs, and the other two form part of the expanding metropolis, these being Chikun LGA to the south, and Igabi LGA to the north (Alahira, 2012). Of the four local government areas, Kaduna North and Kaduna South LGAs are classified as cosmopolitan, a classification that recognizes their diversity in ethnic and religious composition. While Chikun and Igabi LGAs have the Gbagyi, Hausa and Fulani as the main ethnic groups, though without doubts, the parts of these two local government areas that make up the metropolitan area can equally be classified as cosmopolitan as well (Kaduna State Planning and Budget Commission, 2017).

The city from inception was designed for the people of an amalgamated Nigeria. This is illustrated clearly by the preference for locating it outside the principal territories of a dominant ethnic group (Oyedele, 1987). The cosmopolitan nature of Kaduna had largely been peaceful; even though it was never devoid of ethnic and religious differences, these did not result to violent confrontations for many decades. Despite the differences in ethnicity and religion by residents, the polity was greatly integrated as home to a range of ethnic groups that were both indigenous to Kaduna state and those from across the other regions and later states in the country. Population figures for Kaduna in 1963, for instance, showed the Hausa as having 35% of the population and the Igbo as constituting 19% and the Yoruba with 11.0%. In terms of religious affiliations Christians made up 49.4%, and Muslims constituted 49.3 with those of other faiths being 1.3% (North-Central State of Nigeria Statistical Yearbook, 1971: 17). Thus, Christians and Moslems as well the different ethnic groups lived together in an atmosphere of cooperation and peaceful co-existence.

3. THE KAFANCHAN AND ZANGON-KATAF CONFLICTS

There were two major conflicts in the twentieth century in Kaduna metropolis, Both of which had their origins outside the metropolis. The first of these conflicts was that of 1987. The 1987 conflict started in Kafanchan between Christian and Muslim students and subsequently expanded to cover the entire state including Kaduna metropolis (Ubah, 2011). Kafanchan which is the largest city in southern Kaduna and the headquarters of Jema’a local government area is located in the southernmost part of the state from Kaduna metropolis. According to Luka (2020) relations among the diverse people of the area, who were adherents of Christianity or Islam before 1987 were
cordial. But as it often happens when fault lines exist, a religious programme on the campus of the College of Education, Gidan-Waya near to Kafanchan on 6 March 1987 escalated from the campus into the town of Kafanchan in the form of inter-religious violence. From Kafanchan the violence spread with devastating impact to other towns as Daura, Ikara, Funtua and Kaduna, which witnessed episodes of violence with properties and lives being lost to the crisis. The Kafanchan campus crisis brought about a severe breakdown of law and order in the state and across the identified urban centres.

The second conflict whose origins were also not from within Kaduna city emanated from the Zangon Kataf market crisis of 1992. This was an ethno-religious crisis, which also had resonance in the metropolitan area (Ubah, 2011). The crisis had broken out due to efforts to relocate the market in Zangon Kataf to a new location. The relocation effort was supported by the Atyap, while the Hausa were against the relocation. The ensuing crisis like that of 1987 in Kafanchan also escalated beyond Zangon Kataf with Kaduna metropolis feeling the brunt of the escalation. It resulted to hundreds of people being killed in the metropolis along ethno-religious lines (Luka, 2020). The fact that Kaduna was the capital city of Kaduna state with a substantial population of both Christians and Muslims divided along ethnic lines had made it to be prone to retaliatory measures from adherents of the two faiths residing in the city, despite the conflicts having origins beyond the capital city.

4. THE SHARIA CONFLICT

The dawn of the twenty-first century opened with Kaduna metropolis becoming the epicenter of conflicts among residents on a largely religious dimension, but with impact on the ethnic composition of the residents. The Sharia conflict brought to the fore the challenge of conceptualizing any part of Nigeria as an ethnic melting pot. In Nigeria, ethnic groups often maintain their identity even when they migrate to urban centres within and outside their states of origins. A situation decried by Ibrahim (2018: 71) as being due to the “pervasive use of ethnicity as a means of identity.” Such attachment to ethnic identity creates ethno-nationalism among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups. However, despite this lack of inter-ethnic cohesiveness it has been established that peaceful coexistence as well as economic and political stability of urban centres is predicated on cordial inter-ethnic relations prevailing among groups in urban centres irrespective of religious affiliations (Usman, 2018).

The crisis that emanated in 2000 as a result of the debate and disagreements over the introduction of the Sharia legal code in the state that year between Christians and Muslims revealed the fault lines among ethnic and religious communities resident in Kaduna and brought about the most destructive conflict witnessed in the metropolis up to that period. The trigger for the 2000 Sharia crises went back to 14 December 1999 when the Kaduna State House of Assembly constituted an eleven-man committee with respect to the introduction of the Sharia legal system in Kaduna. The house following the setting up of the committee divided along religious lines. The Christian members opposed the proposed bill, while the Muslim members supported it, highlighting that it was “purely a Muslim affair and had nothing to do with the Christians” (Sadiq, 2016: 21). In the public hearings conducted by the committee in January 2000, the Christian members of the house declined to be involved. The Kaduna state public also took positions that were equally reflective of those taken by the honourable members of the house, whereby the Christian public were against the bill and the Muslim public supported its passage. To drive home, their position on the issue the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) on 21 February 2000 staged a public protests calling for the bill to be suspended (Dauwa, 2017). According to Sadiq (2016: 22-3), “The peaceful protest later turned violent as Muslim youth clashed with the Christian protesters, and fighting between the two spiraled out of control, with massive destruction on both sides.” And, while previous conflicts had often had their origins outside Kaduna metropolis and only escalated to the city, the 2000 Sharia crisis emanated from the heart of the city. This was, however, in spite of the impetus for enshrining Sharia in the state’s legal code taking its bearing from the introduction of the Sharia legal system by Zamfara state in 1999. For, following Zamfara, other states in the north also passed laws adopting the Sharia legal code (Sada, 2007).
In the process to introduce Sharia in Kaduna state, the focal issue at its core was the extent to which Sharia should be incorporated into the state’s laws in the context of Kaduna being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity. This was what accounted for the outbreak in violence in Kaduna as opposed to the peaceful introduction of Sharia in other northern states. While other northern states beginning with Zamfara introduced the Sharia legal code without crisis, the attempt to do same in Kaduna degenerated into violence. Against the background of the violence is to be understood the difference between Zamfara and Kaduna states. While Zamfara is largely homogenous in terms of religion and ethnicity, Kaduna, was more or less a mini-Nigeria with a heterogeneous makeup. According to Maier (2000), the heterogeneity of Kaduna in terms of the makeup of the population was a potent factor that could not be ignored by close observers. He noted that:

Kaduna is one of the few cities that truly encapsulates the religious, ethnic, and class diversity that defines Nigeria. Mosques and churches, beer parlors and Koranic schools literally elbow each other for room. Hausa-speaking Muslims from all over the north, and Christians and animists from the south and the middle belt immigrated to Kaduna for its job opportunities and schools... The news that the state government was considering the Sharia question once again raised the political temperature to the boiling point (Maier, 2000: 145).

The above scenario with respect to Kaduna is described in terms of religious polarization rather than religious diversity. According to Meagher (2013: 212), “While measures of diversity reflect the sheer heterogeneity of religious groups, polarization is greatest where two religious groups are of equal size.” It must, however, be noted that it is not a given that religiously diverse or polarized societies should be conflict prone as examples exists of peaceful co-existence of diverse communities across the globe. Peaceful co-existent is often likely to prevail when the state and its institutions take steps to minimize the tension over political and economic goods among groups; and to equally lessen the use of religion as a tool of political expression. In the case of Kaduna, the strong opinions and positions taken for and against the proposed introduction of Sharia in the state would subsequently lead to two major riots in February and May of 2000 that resulted in violence on a massive scale dwarfing previous episodes of conflict in the city (Luka, 2020). The death toll emanating from the violence was in the range of about 2000 and Maier (2000: 146) observed that “Entire neighbourhoods had been ‘religiously cleansed’” and that “Kaduna, however, would never be the same.”

The impact of the Sharia conflicts was fundamentally harmful to the body polity and composition of the city. According to Ubah (2011: 78) the “disputes resulted in the gravest ethno-religious massacres in the history of the city.” A further description of what the city underwent called the episode as “earth-quaking violence of 2000,” whereby “a good part of Kaduna was razed to the ground. In their hundreds, residents fled the city. The economy came to a standstill, and it looked as if Kaduna would become a township of a lower order” (Ubah, 2011: 78). Ramifications of the crisis of February 2000 also had repercussions beyond the city of Kaduna. From Kaduna the crisis escalated eastwards to towns in the eastern states of Abia, Anambra and Imo and affected the towns of Aba, Onitsha and Owerri where killings were reported with an estimated 400 victims in Aba. The scale of these calamitous national disasters caused the Catholic Bishop Conference of Nigeria to describe the situation as it unfolded as that of a nation undergoing national suicide. The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, however, assured Nigerians and the world that what was happening was a hiccup and a blemish on the nation that would soon go away (Maier, 2000).

The devastating Sharia riots in Kaduna probably occurred because the matter while under discussion was taken to the streets by concerned stakeholders where tempers became inflamed and skirmishes quickly escalated to cover the entire state. Before the street protests and its attendant dangers nullified civil debate on the subject, the Kaduna State House of Assembly had convened a committee to appraise the feasibility of promulgating a Sharia bill as was done in the other states. This, by itself, was enough testament to show that arguments from both sides of the issue would be considered before the making of a conclusive decision.
The actions of the Kaduna State Government before the Sharia riots, however, provide a better example of a collaborative attempt between the faiths to build understanding and reach a moderated solution to accommodate the inherent diversities in terms of the multi-religious nature of the citizenry and residents of Kaduna state. The state government under the leadership of Ahmed Makarfi had established the Muslims/Christian Dialogue Forum on the Sharia Legal System and in the events leading to the outbreak of conflict on the Sharia legal code, the members of the forum who numbered over 30 were drawn from the two religions and were holding consultations and discussing position papers from the different faiths through the months of January and February of year 2000 (Maigari, 2000). The Kaduna State Muslims/Christians Dialogue Forum was co-chaired by Alhaji Ja’afaru Makarfi for Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), Kaduna State and Bishop B.A. Achigili for the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). During the meetings “members were advised to display a strong sense of maturity so that rancour and acrimony would have no place in the meeting,” and further resolving that the dialogue forum’s deliberations would be confidential (Minutes, 2000: 5, 41).

In its meeting of Monday, 31 January 2000 members listened to the text of the Christian position paper delivered by Dr. Chris Abashiya and also to the Muslim position paper read by Alhaji Mohammed Sani. The Christian position paper outlined how a report commissioned by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the then premier of Northern Nigeria had outlined the need to adopt a judicial code “which would apply uniformly to all persons living within the Region, which will not discriminate against any section of the community and which would be generally acceptable throughout the Region” (Minutes, 2000: 9). The submission therefore called for the state to look at the Sharia issue as a national one, rather than a matter for the state to decide and hence make recourse to the National Assembly and the Constitutional Courts for an interpretation (Minutes, 2000). The Muslim position paper in its submission provided that the application of Sharia was not going to be compulsive and enforceable on non-Muslims in the state with the jurisdiction covering Muslim related cases only; and that trial in a Sharia Court was optional for non-Muslims, and that as a legal code it would have no implication on ethnic groups or non-Muslims in Kaduna with the system operating side by side with the conventional and customary courts. The position paper outlined that Muslim citizens recognized the ethnic and religious diversity as well as corporate existence of Kaduna state and hence “acknowledged and respect freedom of thoughts, believers and practices of non-Muslims as much as we respect our fellow Muslims” (Minutes, 2000: 37). The Muslim position paper concluded that the call for the Sharia legal system was because of lapses in the common law with regards to Muslims (Minutes, 2000).

Following the presentations, the resolution of the dialogue forum was largely for further deliberations to assimilate the two positions presented preparatory to working out a harmonized position (Minutes, 2000). Alongside the Muslims/Christians Dialogue Forum on Sharia Legal System, the state government had in February 2000 established in the Governor’s Office a Bureau of Religious Affairs with two permanent secretaries, these being Elisha Buba Yero for Christian Affairs and Balarabe Idris Jigo for Islamic Affairs (Minutes, 2000). These twin actions of the state government can therefore be understood as arising from its understanding of the heterogeneous nature of Kaduna State with a more evenly matched population of both faiths, whose beliefs and aspirations, therefore, ought to be understood, negotiated and collaboratively resolved.

It is important to note that while the state government dialogue forum was intended to appraise the situation and make recommendations with regard to the Sharia legislation initiated by the Kaduna State House of Assembly, the house own committee was also proceeding with its sittings. The house deliberations were considered by the public as a step leading directly to Sharia legislation in Kaduna state, and such a conclusion contributed greatly to a state of heightened tension among those who were for or against the proposed legislation. In view of such tension, the dialogue forum in its meeting of 31 January 2000 noted that although the Kaduna state governor had “pledged to request the House to step down their Committee in view of this Committee,” it was “observed that the House
5. THE MISS WORLD CONFLICT

Within the space of two years following the Sharia crisis of 2000, came the 2002 Miss World competition conflicts that racked the city and “led to destruction and bloodshed” (Ubah, 2011: 78). The Miss World crisis occurred as a result of the publication of an article in ThisDay that:

provoked a storm of outrage from Muslims in different parts of the country. It was reported that Muslims across Nigeria were alerted to the article… particularly through text-messages on their mobile phones. However, Kaduna was the only place where the protests took a violent form, even though neither the newspaper nor the writer had any particular link to the state (Sani, 2017: 336-7).

The protests took a violent dimension when on Wednesday, 20 November 2002 protesters attacked and burnt the regional office of ThisDay in Kaduna in Malali. This action, escalated the brewing violence and plunged the city into turmoil. Many people were attacked with high casualties and many became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and sought refuge in camps across the city within military installations and police barracks including at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) where both Christians and Muslims took refuge. NDA became a giant IDPs camp whereby people were housed in the mammy market, senior NCOs mess, offices and in the open air ground and residential quarters (Sani, 2017).

6. THE POST-ELECTORAL CONFLICT OF 2011

Nine years after the Sharia conflict, the city witnessed another crisis of fundamental import. This was the post-election conflict of 18 April 2011. The conflict arose as a result of the victory of President Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) over the candidate of the Congress for Progress Change (CPC) General Muhammadu Buhari. The outbreak of violence erupted from the early hours of Monday 18 April 2011 across Kaduna metropolis (Abdulsalam, 2014). Perpetrators of the violence targeted places of worship and several killings and destructions were witnessed in the metropolis. To lessen further ravages and destruction, the state government imposed “the most severe restrictions in the history of the town when a curfew from 5 am to 6 pm was imposed that lasted almost a month” (Ubah, 2011: 78).

7. INSURGENCY AND BANDITRY

The upsurge of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, despite its epicenter of operation not being in northwestern Nigeria, where Kaduna is located but in northeastern Nigeria also had some impact on the security of lives and property within Kaduna. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has spawned a situation in which armed non-state actors contest with the state for control of territory in the country, thereby generating waves and waves of insecurity (Ifeanyi, 2020). The violent activities of insurgents and non-state actors in Kaduna contributed to the further balkanization of the city that was already underway. Ukpanya and Abdulhamid (2017: 675) noted that:

The violent activities of the Boko Haram in Kaduna metropolis has not in small measure occasioned a situation where Christians have moved in large numbers to the south of the Kaduna river and thereby making the South an unsafe haven for the Muslims who have relocated to the North of the Kaduna river for safe haven.

The incidences of violence in Kaduna and elsewhere in Nigeria, especially during the Fourth Republic has presented Nigeria as “an unstable political entity with serious security challenges” (Muhammed, 2014, p.115). The
repeated episodes of violent conflicts now give Kaduna an atmosphere in which constant volatility is always hanging over it. Furthermore, the evolving trend in armed banditry and kidnapping and its impact on human security for Kaduna metropolis and Kaduna state as a whole has equally been dire. Kidnapping in and around Kaduna metropolis has involved attacks on schools and mass kidnappings as well as the abduction of passengers on the highways leading into the city (Dutse & Olowoselu, 2020; Bassey & Asua, 2020; Oluwajenyo et al., 2022). This has had a severe impact on the level of human security and human development in parts of the metropolis, especially in the suburbs of both the northern and southern parts of the city in the last four decades.

8. IMPACT OF CONFLICTS AND SECURITY RESPONSES

The incidences of violent conflicts in Kaduna in the last four decades did unveil the fragility of peaceful co-existence among the residents of the town on the basis of ethnic, religious and political differences. Over the second half of the existence of the city, it has often been shaped by the explosion of violence that rendered the social and economic fabric of the city apart. On the basis of ethnic and religious identity and to a lesser extent political affiliations the city’s peace has often been repeatedly circumscribed by these episodes of violence with dangerous repercussions on the wellbeing and welfare of inhabitants of the metropolis. These conflicts had left many with shattered lives, loss of lives, loss of property and emotional turmoil in the wake of the destructions often witnessed.

The fallout has been the coming into existence of a segregated city along Christians and Muslims dichotomy where members of each faith moved “to areas where the adherents of their religion were in the majority and where therefore they feel safer and secured” (Ubah, 2011: 79). Kaduna became factionalised and segregated because residents were afraid their security was no longer guaranteed when they took up residence in any part of the city. The perceived insecurity prevented Christians and Muslims from taking up residence in certain places due to fear of “physical, psychological abuse, violence, persecution, or death” (Dutse & Olowoselu, 2020: 111). Consequently, adherents of either religion avoided parts of Kaduna where only members of a particular faith were dominant. Cletus (2017: 190) in a study on the Igbo in Kaduna metropolis notes for instance that: “In all these crises, the Igbo community in Kaduna was affected. This led to relative relocation and shift in demographic patterns. Igbo in the northern part of the metropolis moved to the southern parts. This movement had drastically changed both the settlement pattern and intergroup relation in the metropolis.”

In Kaduna, when crisis breaks out the police are usually the first to be deployed and when the regular detachment fails to curtail the crisis the anti-riot or mobile police is deployed to be followed by the military when the police contingents are unable to halt the rioting or violence. In such an instance the police and the military then form joint action teams and patrols which sometimes operates for extended periods. The joint action teams will also be constituted into formations as standby forces on alert to be deployed round the metropolis in case of additional flashpoints (Sani, 2017). Within Kaduna, the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) provided a sanctuary for displaced persons during the 2002 Miss World crisis that broke out in the city between Christians and Muslims. According to Sani (2017: 335) when crisis breaks out in Kaduna, the tendency is for people to move to where their faith is dominant for safety or to seek out “nearby security agents premises with a view to securing their lives.”

The role of the military and other security agencies in quelling the crises has been recognized as positive. There are, however, reservations to the general conduct of the military and the police in their failure to timely arrest the different episodes of crises from burgeoning and exploding to levels where before they are able to quell it the destruction had become massive and disastrous to hundreds of thousands of residents. Furthermore, Ubah (2011: 79) noted that: “Several some soldiers were reportedly seen joining in the mayhem not in preventing it. Were these men soldiers outside the chain of command or were they criminals in military uniforms? Whichever the case, in the interest of the military itself, people should not be given the cause to feel betrayed.” With respect to the involvement of the military in internal security operations such as the ones in Kaduna, Eugene (2015) analysed some of the challenges the military face when drafted to quell security threats and situations that the traditional
policing and paramilitary units are unable to cope with. Eugene argues against the sustained use of the military in such internal security operations, which they are increasingly called upon to intervene in across the country. Whereby, from only one major threat in the 1960s, the military became involved in more than seven threats of major import by 2016. The limitations which he identifies are due to the fact that:

Certain handicaps tend to face Nigerian armed forces operatives in their theatres of operations. These include, but are not limited to, the following: They carry out ISOs in civilian-populated areas against not-easily-identifiable violent armed men and women. Sometimes, they lack adequate synergistic coordination among themselves. More often than not, full support and cooperation from affiliated paramilitary and civil security agencies and groups may be lacking.

They face constant and isolated cases of civilian collusion with insurgents/terrorists as well as sabotage of their operations (Eugene, 2015: 33).

Olubiyo (2020) in his appraisal equally analysed the same challenges that Eugene discussed concerning military involvement in internal security operations in Nigeria since 1999 and contends that the rate at which the military is being engaged in these activities is on the rise, which equally highlights the limitations of seeking a purely militarized solution to the challenges of internal security. Hence, his proposal is that alternative strategies should be utilized to combat insecurity in the country. He proffers that though “ending insurgency and invisible armed groups has always been a hard kernel to crack. But in the case of Nigeria, the central point to the unsuccessful onslaughts against militancy, insurgency and banditry lies in lack of government political will, unpreparedness of the security agencies and the use of non-suitable strategies, hence the needs for a multi-dimensional approach” (Olubiyo, 2020: 154). His call is therefore for government to address the issues that give rise to insecurity such as poverty, social injustice and infrastructural decay.

The overreliance on the security architecture is also a factor that Alahira (2012: 191) had earlier criticized, indicating that: “Overutilization of military and para-military personnel for security purposes is seen as suppressing the real problems of insecurity such as high rate of unemployment, poverty, and poor social and economic conditions of people generally.” A situation that may continue to worsen as funds are diverted from human development towards the maintenance of the security apparatus due to constant insecurity. At the aftermath of crises, the government usually pays out compensation to those affected running into billions that would have otherwise been invested in developmental projects. Consequently, the outcome of these crises results in destruction of capital and means of livelihood. Crises also further discourage investors from investing in the metropolis thus slowing down the rate of growth and further contributing to the rising poverty rates (Luka, 2020).

9. CONCLUSION
This paper explored the various conflicts and their dimensions as they occurred in Kaduna from 1987 to the opening two decades of the twenty-first century. These conflicts have largely been religious, ethnic and political in character and have occurred along the fault lines of the Christian/Muslim dichotomies within the general outlines of Kaduna state and the broader Nigerian society. The occurrences of these conflicts had the negative impact of fracturing intergroup relations within the metropolis and facilitated the process of the evolution of segregation in parts of the city. The conflicts also led to destruction of properties and economic livelihood as well as the loss of lives. The state and security responses, especially, that of the military, though sometimes, late in coming, usually contribute to mitigating the level of destruction and arresting the duration of such crises. The evolving trajectory of banditry and kidnappings within and around the city is however a crisis situation that the state and people are still grappling with for a solution. The paper also showed how the Kaduna state government during the Sharia crises promoted inter-religious dialogues as channels for inter-group relations and understanding towards conflict prevention and mitigation.
10. FUNDING
This research paper was funded by the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) Institution Based Research (IBR) Grant awarded at Kaduna State University, Kaduna, Nigeria.

References


